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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Randi Hales died on July 31, 1986, as a result of injuries 
sustained in a compensable accident while in the employ of 
defendant/appellant. Hales Sand and Gravel. Randi Hales was not 
married, had no children and left no persons dependent upon her for 
support. Hales Sand and Gravel was insured at the time of the 
accident for all liabilities resulting from claims under the Workers 
Compensation Act. The company's insurance carrier, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, sent a letter to the Industrial 
Commission on August 19, 1987, accepting liability for the no 
dependent death benefit as provided for in Section 35-1-68(2)(a), 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended). (R. p. 1 and 3). Upon receipt of the 
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$30,000.00 into the Uninsured Employers Fund. Hales Sand and 
Gravel (hereinafter referred to as Hales) filed a Motion for Review 
which was denied by the Industrial Commission on December 31, 1986. 
(R. p. 7-8.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The no dependent death benefit was originally enacted in 1917 
with the first Worker's Compensation Act in Utah. It has been used 
to provide funding for the second injury fund and the Uninsured 
Employers1 Fund. John Hales, the "owner" of Hales Sand and Gravel, 
was instrumental in proposing and lobbying the 1987 Utah Legislature 
for passage of a bill which eliminates the no dependent death 
benefit but continues other funding sources for both of these 
funds. The passage of that bill does not evidence that the benefit 
was unconstitutional. 
The creation and funding of the Uninsured Employers1 Fund was a 
proper exercise of the legislature's police power in carrying out 
the intent and purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act. 
•"•The Order listed Hales Sand and Gravel and/or the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah as defendants. The listing of Hales Sand 
and Gravel as a defendant in the Order does not mean that it is 
primarily responsible for the payment of the no dependent death 
benefit. Hales Sand and Gravel has contingent liability in the 
event the insurance carrier defaults. See American Fuel Co. v. 
Industrial Commission. Utah. 187 P. 633 (1920). Since the defendant 
insurance carrier admitted liability and did not appeal the Order 
awarding benefits coupled with the fact that there is no evidence 
that the carrier is likely to default on the Order, it is highly 
unlikely that Hales Sand will be required to make payment of any 




PAYMENT OF A NONDEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT 
IS NOT A TAX AS DEFINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
Defendant Hales argues that the nondependent death benefit 
provided for in Section 35-1-68(2)(A), U.C.A. (1953, as amended) 
should be categorized as a tax and not as "compensation". In 
support of its argument. Hales notes that the benefit "is for a 
public purpose rather than a payment directly to an employee or his 
dependents as a result of the employee's injury or death." 
(Appellant's brief p. 4) Even though the benefit is not a payment 
made directly to one of Hales' employees, the nondependent death 
benefit has been defined by the Supreme Court of Utah as 
compensation under the Workers Compensation A£t. 
As originally enacted in 1917, the compensation system 
... gave dependents of a workman killed in the 
course of his employment the option pf either 
suing under the wrongful death statute or 
accepting the death benefits provided by the 
compensation act. By necessity the statute was 
framed in the alternative form, because Article 
XVI, Section 5, [of the Utah Constitution] 
precluded a statutory provision makihg death 
benefits ... the exclusive remedy. 
Star v. Industrial Commission, Utah 615 P.2d 436 
(1980) at p. 438. 
In 1921, Article XVI, Section 5, was amended by the addition of 
the concluding clause to read as follows: 
The right of action to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death, shall never be 
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not 
be subject to any statutory limitation except in 
-3-
cases where compensation for injuries resulting 
in death is provided for by law, (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The amendment was essential if workers compensation was to be 
the exclusive remedy in all types of compensable injuries including 
those resulting in the death of an employee. With the passage of 
the amendment, nondependent heirs and personal representatives of 
deceased employees were no longer allowed to sue the employer at 
common law. That was the holding in the leading case of Henrie v. 
Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, 113 Utah 415, 196 P.2d 487 
(1948), an action brought by a nondependent father in the state 
district court for the wrongful death of his minor son. The son had 
died of injuries sustained in a work related accident while employed 
by the defendant. Rocky Mountain. In as much as the son was 
"unmarried, childless and left no dependents", the defendant was 
ordered to pay $1,000.00 into the state treasury as a no dependent 
death benefit. The father sought to recover damages and maintained 
that since the $1,000.00 payment to the state treasury was "not a 
benefit to him," it was not "compensation" under either the 1921 
constitutional amendment or under the workers compensation act. 
Since it was not compensation, the plaintiff argued, the exclusive 
remedy provisions of workers compensation law did not operate to 
prevent the bringing of a wrongful death action under Article XVI, 
Section 5, of the Utah Constitution. 
In reasoning that the no dependent death benefit constitutes 
"compensation" the Supreme Court stated that: 
Workmen's Compensation Acts were designed to 
correct what had become a generally recognized 
-4-
evil. Prior to their enactment, the personal 
representatives or heirs of a workman killed in 
the course of his employment could not recover 
for his death, unless negligence on the part of 
the employer could be established. Moreover, the 
defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary 
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule, 
freguently defeated the cause of action. Even 
where recoveries were had. they usually came only 
after months or years of expensive litigation, 
and were largely reduced by attorney's fees and 
other costs. On the other hand, where recoveries 
were allowed, sympathetic juries frequently 
returned grossly excessive verdicts 
The intention of the acts, then, Was to secure 
workmen and their dependents (not heirs or 
personal representatives) against becoming 
objects of charity, by making reasonable 
compensation for calamities incidental to the 
employment, and to make human wastage in industry 
part of the cost of production. 
Compensation is a concept wholly different 
from that of damages. Damages are based upon 
fault, are generally limited only by the findings 
and conscience of the jury, and in death cases 
are payable to heirs or personal representatives 
without regard to dependency. Compensation, on 
the other hand, generally has no relation to 
fault, is fixed or limited by statute, and is 
payable to dependents only. i 
Plaintiff contends that because the money [no 
dependent death benefit] paid by defendant or its 
insurance carrier into the state treasury did not 
benefit him, it was not compensation within the 
meaning of Article XVI. Section 5 of the 
Constitution. Viewed in the light of the history 
of that section of the Constitution, and of the 
Workmen1s Compensation legislation, the 
contention is untenable.... "Compensation." as 
used in the amendment to the Constitution, means 
the same as it is used and defined in the 
compensation act, i.e. any payment reguired by 
the act to be made to a workman or to his 
dependents, or for their benefit, or into the 
state treasury for the special purposes of the 
compensation act. This includes ... payments 
into the state treasury as provided by the 
act.... (Emphasis supplied) 
Henrie. supra, at p. 426-428 
-5-
In the more recent case of Star v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
the Supreme Court of Utah cited Henrie. supra, with approval in a 
broader challenge to the no dependent death benefit. In Star, the 
deceased employee's mother made application for death benefits in 
the Industrial Commission under Section 35-1-68. even though she was 
not dependent on the employee. Her claim was denied by the 
Industrial Commission. The Supreme Court noted: 
On appeal, plaintiff characterizes the death 
benefits paid under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act as funds resulting from the wrongful death of 
an individual, and she claims it constitutes an 
unjust enrichment to pay such benefits to the 
special fund of the State of Utah rather than to 
the estate or family of decedent. 
Star, supra, at p. 437 
While not specifically addressing the "unjust enrichment" 
portion of plaintiff's argument, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Industrial Commission and reiterated its earlier holding that the 
definition of "compensation" as contained in Section 35-1-44(6). 
U.C.A. (1953. as amended) includes payment by an employer or his 
insurance company of the no dependent death benefit to the state 
treasury for the "special fund". 
Hales did not attempt in its brief to distinguish the Henrie or 
Star cases or the resulting characterization of the no dependent 
death benefit as "compensation." Admittedly, those two cases deal 
with a slightly different type of challenge than is being made here 
by Hales. However, cases involving challenges to the statute made 
by employers or insurance carriers on constitutional grounds have 
uniformly held that the no dependent death benefit is a permissible 
-6-
exercise of a state's police power and does not offend equal 
protection or due process principles. This result is reached 
regardless of whether or not the court categorizes the benefit as a 
tax or as compensation. 
POINT II 
THE NO DEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT IS AN APPROPRIATE 
EXERCISE OF THE STATE'S POLICE POWER AND 
AS SUCH DOES NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF PROPERTY 
WITHOUT EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
The provision for a no dependent death benefit was enacted with 
the first Utah workers' compensation law in 1917. The funds so 
collected were used exclusively for the Second Injury Fund until 
2 
1984. In the very early case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial 
Commission, (1921) 58 Utah 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259, the 
Supreme Court, citing with approval from Plaintiff's brief said: 
Bearing in mind that "the cost of human 
wreckage may be taxed against the.industry which 
employs it," this cost of human wreckage ought 
not to be borne by the state or the taxpayers of 
the state as such, for the primary obligation 
rests upon the industry which employs labor. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the state of Utah in 
1917, when the Industrial Act was passed, 
provided, without expense to employers, a 
tribunal for the administration of the act ... 
including salaries of [the commissioners and 
support staff which] ... might have been imposed 
solely upon the industries employing labor. As 
against these contributions of the state for the 
benefit of industries employing labor, can it be 
justly contended that the demands of the statute 
that each industry pay into the state treasury 
[the no dependent death benefit] ... in the event 
of the remote contingency of an employe's death 
2Originally designated as the "special fund" and later the 
"combined injury fund" the purpose of that fund has remained 
substantially the same. The 1984 amendments created what is now 
known as the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
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by accident without dependents is either 
discriminatory or unjust? Can it be justly 
contended that the classification is arbitrary or 
capricious, or that the statute is a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws? We think not. 
We do not understand that a classification, in 
order to avoid objections as to its 
constitutionality, should be absolutely uniform 
and equal in every respect as between the parties 
composing the class. That equality is not always 
practicable is recognized in many cases decided 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
especially in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas 
Co., 220 U.S. 61. at page 78, 31 Sup. Ct. 337. at 
page 340 (55 L.Ed. 360. Ann. Cas. 1912C. 160). 
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Van 
Devanter. says: 
"The rules by which this contention must be 
tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of this 
court, are these (1) The equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from 
the state the power to classify in the adoption 
of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a 
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and 
avoids what is done only when it is without any 
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely 
arbitrary. (2) A classification having some 
reasonable basis does not offend against that 
clause merely because it is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it 
results in some inequality. (3) When the 
classification in such a law is called in 
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be 
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of 
that state of facts at the time of the law was 
enacted must be assumed. (4) One who assails the 
classification in such a law must carry the 
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any 
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." 
Citations omitted. Salt Lake City, supra, at p. 
155. 
At the time Salt Lake City was decided, the no dependent death 
benefit was required of any "employer not insured in the State 
Insurance Fund...." The Utah Court noted that it was within the 
legislature's power to require that all employers insure with the 
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State Insurance Fund therefor 
[i]n the absence of some logical reason or 
authority to the contrary, we feel compelled to 
hold that the state had the power to name the 
terms and conditions upon which employers might 
insure the payment of compensation to their 
employes even though there was an apparent 
discrimination in favor of the state. 
Salt Lake City, supra, at p. 157 
Soon after Salt Lake City was decided, the provision exempting 
the State Insurance Fund from payment of the no dependent death 
benefit was changed to require contribution by all employers or 
their carriers- In analyzing the constitutionality of the no 
dependent death benefit after the change, the Utah Supreme Court 
again upheld both the requirement that the benefit be paid and the 
purpose for which it was to be used in United Air Lines Transport 
Corporation et al. v. Industrial Commission et al.. 151 P.2d 591 
(Utah 1944): 
... The fundamental principles of the law of 
workmen's compensation were unknown to the people 
and the times that produced our common law. 
Workmen's compensation is the natural product of 
necessity. The numerous hazards which 
accompanied the growth of industry with the 
development of power-driven machinery antiquated 
the common law. Need for a new method and means 
of giving greater protection and security to the 
worker and his dependents against injury and 
death occurring in the course of employment gave 
birth to legislative law. This creature of the 
legislature with improvements and refinements is 
now commonly called workmen's compensation. 
Its existence is not due to the needs nor 
influence of employes alone. It has been 
promoted and sustained for its benefits to both 
capital and labor and the general good done 
society by its usefulness. It bases its right to 
existence in the police power of the State. Park 
Utah Consol. Mines Co. et al. v. Industrial 
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Comm. , 84 Utah 481, 36 P. 2d 979. Workmen's 
compensation is the result of compromise made 
between master and servant, chaperoned by 
society, for the benefit of all. 
United Air Lines, supra, at p. 594-595 
The Court noted that although there still existed some confusion 
on "extraterritorial jurisdiction" issues, 
... the right to enact workmen's compensation 
laws is now well settled. The statutes have 
repeatedly been held to be constitutional.... 
Also, such laws providing for creation and 
maintenance of a special fund as set up by the 
Utah statute, 42-1-64, U.C.A. 1943, [now section 
35-1-68] have, almost universally, been held 
constitutional. (Emphasis supplied) 
United Air Lines, supra, at p. 595 
After citing with approval the U. S. Supreme Court decision in 
the case of Sheehan Co. v Shuler, 265 U.S. 371. 44 S.Ct. 548, 68 
L.Ed. 1061, 35 A.L.R. 1056, the Utah Court went on to hold that 
... the creation of a special fund where the 
employe dies without dependents is not taking 
property without due process of law.... The 
great weight of the decisions of our appellate 
courts during the last twenty-five years is that 
an employer or insurance carrier is not deprived 
of property without due process of law by a 
workmen's compensation act requiring compensation 
for death of an employe. This court has held 
that the workmen's compensation statute is not 
unconstitutional as a denial of egual protection 
of laws, nor as taking property without due 
process. (Emphasis supplied) 
United Air Lines, supra, at p. 595 
In the leading United States Supreme Court case, Sheehan v 
Shuler, supra, the Court reviewed a New York statute which created 
two separate funds for the benefit of employees. One of the funds 
was in most respects identical to Utah's second injury fund and the 
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other fund was for the maintenance of "employees undergoing 
vocational rehabilitation." Payment was reguired only of employers 
or their insurance carriers in "certain employments classed as 
hazardous," Those certain employers were reguired to pay $500.00 
into each fund in the event an employee died with no dependents. 
The Sheehan Company was "in one of the hazardous occupations" and 
challenged the payment of the benefit on the grounds that the law 
was "in conflict with the 14th Amendment, and that the awards made 
thereunder deprive them of their property without due process and 
deny them the egual protection of the laws." The U.S. Supreme Court 
first examined the purpose of the two "special funds" and held that: 
... The use of such special funds for such 
purposes is an additional compensation to the 
employees ... [which] is neither unjust nor 
unreasonable.... 
We do not think that the due process clause of 
the 14th Amendment reguires that such additional 
compensation to injured employees of the 
specified classes should be paid by their 
immediate employers, or prevents the legislature 
from providing for its payment out of general 
funds so created.... 
The payments thus reguired are not unfair and 
unreasonable in amount. The aggregate for the 
two funds is $1,000. This is much less than the 
maximum payment which may be reguired according 
to the scales in case the employee leaves 
survivors entitled to death benefits, and seems 
not to exceed, if it eguals. the average amount 
of the payments reguired in such cases. 
... Nor are these provisions in conflict with the 
egual protection clause. The contention of the 
companies is that the prescribed awards are in 
the nature of a tax imposed upon the happening of 
a contingency, and are of unegual application; 
that is that they are imposed only upon such 
employers as happen to have employees who are 
killed without leaving survivors entitled to 
-11-
compensation. However, this is not a 
discrimination between different employers, but 
merely a contingency on the happening of which 
all employers alike become subject to the 
requirements of the law. All are required to 
contribute, under identical conditions, to these 
special funds. 
Citations omitted, Sheehan, supra, at p. 
1059-1060. 
Defendant Hales asserts in his brief that "the only difference 
between employers who must pay into the Fund and those who are not 
required to do so is the paying employer who is unfortunate enough 
to hire an employee who dies without dependents;" and "should the 
employee die with dependents, the employer is not responsible for 
the payment of the $30,000.00." Hales argues that this creates an 
arbitrary classification which deprives him of equal protection of 
the law because he must pay money which would not be due had his 
employee left dependents. This is not true. Defendant Hales 
completely ignores Section 35-l-68(e) which reads as follows: 
If there are wholly or partly dependent 
persons at the time of death and the total amount 
of the awards paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to 
the termination of dependency, including any 
remarriage settlement, does not exceed $30,000. 
the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay 
the difference between the amount paid and 
$30,000 into the Second Injury Fund provided for 
in Subsection (1). 
It is clear from this provision that $30,000.00 is the minimum 
payment due in the event of a compensable death. And. as in 
Sheehan. supra. "[t]his is much less than the maximum payment which 
may be required ... in case the employee leaves [dependants]." An 
employer or. as in this case, its insurance carrier pays a minimum 
-12-
of $30,000.00 in every death case regardless of the existence of 
dependents. Thus the class here is all employers whose employees 
die from compensable injuries. Employers whose employees have no 
dependents are not required to pay more money, only the minimum. 
Hales next argues that the nondependent cjeath benefit is 
discriminatory and thus deprives him of equal protection because an 
uninsured employer "is subject to liability urtder this statute only 
if his employee dies with no dependents." (Appellant's brief at p. 
14.) This is also untrue. When an employer is uninsured, he 
becomes liable for all workers compensation benefits including death 
benefits payable to dependents. 
Section 35-1-45. U.C.A. (1953, as amended) states: 
Every employee ... who is injured, ... by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment, ... shall be paid compensation for 
loss sustained on account of the injury.... 
Section 35-1-58, U^C.A. (1953, as amended) states: 
Any employee, whose employer [is uninsured] ... 
may, in lieu of proceeding against his employer 
by civil action in the courts ... file his 
application with the commission for compensation 
... and the commission shall hear and determine 
such application for compensation a$ in other 
cases; and the amount of compensation which the 
commission may ascertain and determine to be due 
to such injured employee ... shall be paid by 
such employer.... (Emphasis supplied.) 
Hales seems to argue that the Uninsured Employers1 Fund pays for 
all compensable injuries suffered by employees of uninsured 
employers. Defendant states: 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 35-1-57, maKes 
uninsured employers liable in a civil action for 
any injury received by an employee, as an 
alternative to reimbursement for the injury by 
-13-
way of the Uninsured Employers1 Fund (Defendant's 
brief p. 15). 
This argument ignores the clear language of Section 35-1-107 
subsections (1) and (3). (U.C.A.. 1953, as amended) which provides: 
(1) There is created a Uninsured Employers Fund 
for the purpose of paying and assuring. ... 
workers' compensation benefits [to employees] 
when ... [their] employer ... becomes or is 
insolvent. ... or otherwise does not have 
sufficient funds ... to cover workers' 
compensation liabilities under this chapter.... 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other 
benefits paid or payable to ... an employee ... 
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the fund, by 
subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and 
benefits of the employee ... against the employer 
failing to make the compensation payments. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
These sections make it clear that an uninsured employer is 
liable for at least the same benefits as an insured employer. The 
Uninsured Employers' Fund only becomes liable when the uninsured 
employer is "insolvent." In fact, an uninsured employer may be 
liable for damages far in excess of the benefits allowable under the 
workers' compensation laws in the event an employee elected to sue 
at common law. Section 35-1-57. U.C.A. (1953. as amended) is not 
"an alternative to reimbursement for the injury by way of the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund" but an alternative to the limits imposed 
upon applicants in an action before the Industrial Commission. 
Section 35-1-58. gives the injured employer the option to file with 
the Industrial Commission. 
Employers who shall fail to comply with the 
[mandatory insurance] provisions of Section 
35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of 
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this title during the period of noncompliance, 
but shall be liable in a civil action to their 
employees for damages suffered by reason of 
personal injuries arising out of or in the course 
of employment caused by the wrongful act. neglect 
or default of the employer or any of the 
employer's officers, agents or employees, and 
also to the dependents or personal 
representatives of such employees where death 
results from such injuries. 
Thus nondependent heirs or the personal representative of a 
deceased employee could sue at common law for wrongful death even if 
they were not dependent on the employee if the employer were 
uninsured. Those were the types of suits disallowed by the holdings 
in Henrie and Star. Had the employers been uninsured in those 
cases, the nondependent beneficiaries would have prevailed. 
Hales cites Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission. 
187 Cal. 774, 204 Pac. 226 (1922), in support of his argument that 
no dependent death benefits are a tax and as such are 
unconstitutional. A careful reading of Yosemite reveals that the 
California Supreme Court found the benefit unconstitutional on the 
basis of the California state constitution which differs 
dramatically from Utahfs in this respect. 
The California Constitution was amended in 1918 to provide for 
the enactment of a workers' compensation system "to create and 
enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons, or the 
dependents of their workmen for injury ... sustained by the said 
workman in the course of their employment." The California Court 
held that that constitutional provision did, 
... [N]ot authorize the creation of a liability 
on the part of any person to compensate the 
workmen of other persons, or the dependents of 
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workmen of other persons. The phrase "their 
workmen" necessarily confines the persons to be 
compensated to workmen who are in the employ of 
the person who is made liable. 
Yosemite, supra, at p. 998. 
Thus the Yosemite Court found that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it went beyond a specific grant of 
authority in the California Constitution. This specific grant 
limited the power of the legislature. And notwithstanding the 
Court's conclusion in the case, the Court recognized the 
legislature's right to provide a fund for the benefit of those 
disabled in industry. 
It may be conceded that, under its general 
powers, the legislature might provide a fund for 
the benefit of persons disabled in industry in 
this state, and commit the administration of the 
fund to the Industrial Accident Commission, and 
might also levy a tax in some form to raise such 
fund. (Emphasis supplied) 
Yosemite, supra, at p. 1000. 
Finally, the court in Yosemite, supra, distinguished 
State Industrial Commission v. Newman, 222 N.Y. 
363, 118 N.E. 794, [because] ... [t]he 
Constitution of New York contains no provision 
limiting the power of the legislature of that 
state ... such as are contained in our 
[constitution]....3 
Yosemite, supra, at p. 1000 
3The California Constitution was amended in 1972 to cure this 
defect. California now provides for a no dependent death benefit in 
the amount of $75,000.00. The funds so generated go to that state's 
eguivalent of the second injury fund. California Labor Code, 
Sections 4701, 4702 and 4706.5. 
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The Utah Constitution, not unlike New York's, contains no express 
provision against the legislature's passing a no dependent death 
benefit further distinguishing the Yosemite case from these facts. 
Such was the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court in Horn Ace. 
Ins. et al. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona et al., 269 P. 501 
(1928). There the Court examined a no dependent death benefit for 
the use of a rehabilitation fund. With a "constitutional mandate 
somewhat similar to" the California provision analyzed in Yosemite, 
the Arizona court refused to follow the reasoning of the California 
Supreme Court. The Arizona Court noted that the California Court 
... [B]ased its ruling upon the ground that the 
express grant of power to require employers to 
compensate their workmen and their dependents 
implies that the power to compel them to 
compensate the state for the benefit of the 
workmen of others is not granted. "The language 
of neither one of these parts of the section 
shows or expresses," the court said. "an intent 
to add another liability to that expressly 
stated," and it held that the maxim, "The 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another," was applicable. 
There is no question but that this view is 
correct, when the power to enact legislation does 
not exist independently of the Constitution, 
because a provision in that instrument directing 
the Legislature to enact particular legislation 
necessarily carries with it no authority to enact 
something not included therein. But, when such 
power does exist, irrespective of the 
Constitution, ... the Legislatures of the states 
have all legislative power, except that withheld 
from them by the state Constitutions, or 
surrendered to the federal government. In Clark 
v. Boyce, 20 Ariz, 544. 185 P.136, tphis court 
said: 
"The Legislature has all power n<>t prohibited 
to it by the state or federal Constitution." 
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In Inspiration Consolidated Cooper Co, v. 
Mendez, 19 Ariz. 151, 166 P.278, it used this 
language: 
"The legislative power of the state is not 
controlled nor controllable by simple mandatory 
directions given by means of constitutional 
provisions which direct action, but do not 
restrict action on the part of the Legislature. 
When the Legislature is not constitutionally 
restricted, it may act or not as the occasion may 
seem proper, and in acting may pass any law the 
Legislature deems for the welfare of the state, 
unless prohibited by some positive constitutional 
provision, and all such laws not so prohibited 
are valid." 
That the Legislature could, under its general 
powers, enact a law requiring employers to pay 
the state a certain sum for the promotion of the 
vocational rehabilitation of those disabled in 
industry, the same as it could a Workmen's 
Compensation Law, both being within the police 
power of the state, there is no question.... 
Horn Ace., supra, at p. 503-504 
The petitioners in Home Ace., supra, urged the Arizona Court to 
adopt a position not unlike Hales is urging here, namely to declare 
that the no dependent death benefit is a tax and unconstitutional. 
The Arizona Court reasoned that the benefit is 
[N]ot a tax on property at all, but a part of the 
compensation the employer, the insurance carrier, 
or the state compensation fund is compelled to 
pay, when the employee killed in the course of 
his employment leaves no dependents. It is just 
as much a part of the expense the employer must 
bear or his insurance carrier assume as the 
amounts to be paid directly to the employee or 
his dependents, because it is imposed for the 
same general purpose, the promotion of the 
welfare of those disabled in industry, and in the 
exercise of the same power, the police power of 
the state. The fact that it reaches the injured 
employee for whom it is intended through a 
somewhat different channel that is, is paid into 
the state treasury and held in a special fund, to 
provide in the manner stated for the promotion of 
the vocational rehabilitation of persons disabled 
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in industry does not give it a tax status 
different in any degree from that of the 
compensation that must be paid directly to 
employees or their dependents. Being imposed for 
the same purpose, and in the exercise of the same 
power, it is necessarily the same kind of tax as 
other compensation, and under all the authorities 
this is not a tax on property, but a tax on 
occupation or business. 
The third principal objection to thje 
constitutionality of the act is that it violates 
the provisions of the Constitution designed to 
secure equal and uniform taxation of property for 
public purposes. As the charge laid on the 
persons engaged in the industries named in the 
act is a pecuniary burden imposed by public 
authority, it partakes of the nature of a tax, 
and in the language of a distinguished judge 
discussing a similar question, "for many purposes 
might be so spoken of without harm." But it is 
manifest that it is not a "tax" in the sense the 
word is used in the sections of the constitution 
to which reference is here made. The accession 
to the public revenue, general or local, is 
authorized or aimed at. The purpose of the 
exaction is entirely different* It is to be 
used, not to meet the current expenses of 
government, but to recompense employees of the 
industries on whom the burden is imposed for 
injuries received by them while engaged in the 
pursuit of their employments. It is the 
consideration which the owners of the industries 
pay for the privilege of carrying them on. It is 
therefore in the nature of a license tax, and can 
be justified on the principle of law that 
justifies the imposition and collection of 
license taxes generally. 
Under the great weight of authority, a tax on 
occupation, business, etc., is not, in legal 
contemplation, a tax on property, which falls 
within the inhibition imposed by the usual 
constitutional provision in relation to 
uniformity of taxation. 
Horn Ace., supra, at p. 504-505 
The Arizona Court next focused its attention on the due process 
and equal protection questions: 
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... The argument is that this provision is 
arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory, in 
that it provides for a special classification, 
consisting of only those employers coming under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act who employ persons 
without dependents, but with the right to claim 
compensation, and that it is not required that 
the beneficiaries of the payments thus made be 
employees of the persons whose payments create 
the fund, nor the dependents of such employees, 
but merely that they be employees disabled in 
industry. We think it perfectly plain that, 
though subdivision 9 does provide that only those 
employers who happen to have an employee without 
dependents killed shall make the payments in 
question, and that the beneficiaries of the fund 
may be employees of employers other than those 
making the payments, neither of these facts 
render it arbitrary or discriminatory, because 
the contingency up on the occurrence of which the 
employer becomes liable, is just as applicable to 
one employer as another. And perhaps it was 
thought that it would tend to place all employees 
upon a more nearly equal footing in the matter of 
securing employment, since the Legislature may 
have entertained the idea that employees without 
dependents would be given the preference by some 
employers, in the absence of such provision, 
inasmuch as the accidental death of a workman 
without dependents would mean that the employer 
would pay the funeral expenses and nothing more. 
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission. 58 
Utah. 314. 199 P. 152. 18 A.L.E. 259. the Supreme 
Court of that state reached the same conclusion 
upon a statute identically the same in effect as 
... the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state. 
Horn Ace.. supra. at p. 505-506 
POINT III 
THE CREATION OF THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' 
FUND IS AN APPROPRIATE EXERCIZE OF THE STATE'S 
POLICE POWER 
Previous cases have dealt with no dependent death benefits 
payable to a fund similar to Utah's second injury fund or to a fund 
used for rehabilitation purposes. By amendment in 1984 the Utah 
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legislature created what is now known as the Uninsured Employers* 
Fund and diverted the no dependent death benefits to that fund. In 
1986 the legislature again amended the statute to provide a one time 
infusion of additional funding for the Uninsured Employers Fund by 
way of a premium tax. The premium tax as provided for in the 1986 
amendments was to be collected for fiscal year 1986-1987 only. The 
1987 legislative amendments abolished the no dependent death benefit 
as a source of funding but provided for the continuation of the 
premium tax as a perpetual funding source for the Uninsured 
Employers Fund. Hales does not make a direct challenge to the 
legislature's power to create the Uninsured Employers1 Fund nor to 
provide funding through a premium tax for such a purpose. He does 
state however that the Uninsured Employers' Fund "would not be 
necessary if the Industrial Commission took the time and effort to 
enforce the [mandatory insurance] provisions of Title 35." 
(Appellant's brief at p. 16) On page 17 of hjis brief. Hales asserts 
"[t]here would be no need for the fund or at least a lesser need if 
the Industrial Commission would enforce the provisions provided in 
Title 35." There is absolutely no evidence in the record of this 
case to support the accusation. Hales argues that if the criminal 
laws were enforced there would be no crime. fThis Court should not 
engage in the type of speculation needed in reference to that 
issue. Additionally, the Industrial Commission investigates over 
4,000 suspected uninsured employers yearly since the creation of the 
Uninsured Employers Fund provided the funding necessary to conduct 
those investigations. Finally, the standards under which the 
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legislation should be judged have been set out in the cases earlier 
cited. 
The Uninsured Employers Fund was created in 1984 in response to 
the insolvency of a certified self-insured employer. That 
insolvency, which occurred in 1983, resulted in the loss of workers1 
compensation benefits by many injured employees. Their plight 
brought to focus a problem which had plagued the Industrial 
Commission since it was established seventy years ago. 
An employee is often unable to resume employment after an 
injury. Outstanding medical bills can result in additional 
financial pressure. Most private health insurance policies 
specifically exclude coverage for on-the-job injuries. Health care 
providers often refuse all but emergency care when a patient is 
without insurance and unable to pay. An injured employee, unable to 
work and in need of medical care, is among society's most 
disadvantaged citizens if there are no workers' compensation 
benefits available to satisfy his ongoing expenses. Where his 
employer has no insurance, or inadequate insurance, the employer is 
ultimately responsible for workers' compensation benefits under the 
Act. When the employer is unable to pay because of insolvency, the 
injured employee must shoulder the entire burden of financial and 
physical loss. If the employee is unable to pay, the responsibility 
may become that of welfare or charity. 
A majority of the states now provide benefits for the employees 
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4 
of uninsured insolvent employers. In all states except 
California, the funds are provided by insured employers either 
through a premium tax or a death benefit. Respondents are 
unaware of any case where these funds or the source of funding has 
been successfully challenged. As was noted earlier, the proper test 
lies with the state1s police power as outlined by the U. S. Supreme 
Court in Lindsley. supra. Hales has failed to show an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the legislature in creating a fund to pay 
for those who otherwise might become wards of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
The provision for a no dependent death benefit is a 
constitutionally permissible exercise of the legislature's police 
power and is neither unjust or unfair. To overrule the Industrial 
Commission and find that the benefit should apate to the Workers1 
Compensation Fund of Utah at the expense of the Uninsured Employers1 
Fund will not alleviate the suffering of Hales, the father. The 
Order of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this %' day of June. 1987 
u. ^2X 
' Suzan Pixton 
Attorney for Respondents 
4State Workers' Compensation Laws. U.S. department of Labor. 
July 1983. 
California's Uninsured Employers' Fund deceives it's funding 
from the general fund. Workers' Compensation Benefits, Worrall & 
Appel. 1985. p. 150-155. 
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35-1-68- Second Injury Fund — Injury causing death —* 
Burial expenses — No dependents, payments to 
Uninsured Employers' Fund — Payments to de-" 
pendents- .^  
(1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the purpose of making 
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2. This fund shall succeed to 
all monies heretofore held in that fund designated as the "Special Fund" or 
the "Combined Injury Fund" and whenever reference is made elsewhere in 
this code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" that refer-
ence shall be deemed to be the Second Injury Fund. The state treasurer 
shall be the custodian of the Second Injury Fund and the commission shall 
direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistance may be paid 
from the proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall appoint a mem-
ber of his staff to represent the Second Injury Fund in all proceedings 
brought to enforce claims against it. 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of 
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial ex-
penses of the deceased as provided in § 35-1-81, and further benefits in the 
amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no 
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the 
date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the 
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereafter 
be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after reaching the 
initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into either the 
Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may be 
required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near 
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be re-
duced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or 
due the deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a 
dependency claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order 
and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made by the commis-
sion, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the 
employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted 
against the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is 
filed within one year from the date of death, the commission's tempo-
rary order shall become permanent and final. If no temporary order 
has been issued and no claim for dependency has been filed within one 
year from the date of death, the commission may issue a permanent 
order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into 
the Second Injury Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent 
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of 
death of the deceased. 
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons 'at the time of the 
death, the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 
66%% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a 
minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the 
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but 
not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week, to continue during dependency for the re-
mainder of the period between the date of the death and not to 
exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during 
dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period 
described in Subsection (2) (b) (i) shall be an amount equal to the 
weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during 
that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal 
social security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent per-
sons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the 
commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually 
thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the 
facts and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no 
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered 
a partly dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such 
benefits as the commission may determine pursuant to Subsection 
(2) (c) (ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving 
spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be 
wholly dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the 
employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-
year period and, in determining the then existing annual income 
of the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any
 % 
federal social security death benefits received by that surviving 
spouse, 
(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, 
the payment shall be 662/3% of the decedent's average weekly I 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue 
during dependency for the remainder of the period between the 
date of death and not to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the 
date of injury as the commission in each case may determine and 
shall not amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. The bene-
fits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the 
circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of 
injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this 
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this 
title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pur-
suant to Subsection (2) (b) (iii) shall be determined by the commis-
sion in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of depen-
dency existing at the time of the dependency review and may be 
paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate 
that partly dependent person would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons 
during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier. 
(d) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent 
persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the bene-
fits as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits 
awarded to all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum pro-
vided for by law. 
(e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of 
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of depen-
dency, including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed $30,000, 
the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between ! 
the amount paid and $30,000 into the Second Injury Fund provided for J 
in Subsection (1). ! 
ADDENDUM B 
A-2 
anility — £ uncling — Administration — Subro-
gation — Insolvent employer — Fund's rights 
with wrongful act or neglect — Adjusting 
claims — Duty to notify — Penalty — Assess-
ment of self-insured employers. 
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for the purpose of 
paying and assuring, to persons entitled to workers' compensation benefits 
when every employer of the claimant who is found to be individually, 
jointly, or severally liable becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has ap-
pointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, 
sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities under 
this chapter. This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the De-
fault Indemnity Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is 
liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, 
Title 35, with the exception of penalties on those obligations. 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided pursuant 
to Subsections 35-1-68 (2) (a) and 31A-3-201 (2). The state treasurer is the 
custodian of the Uninsured Employers' Fund and the commission shall 
direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration may be paid from 
the fund. The commission shall employ counsel to represent the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on 
behalf of the fund, and upon the request of the commission, the attorney 
general, city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which any inves-
tigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title is pending, or in 
which the employee resides or an employer resides or is doing business, 
shall aid in the representation of the fund. 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable 
to or on behalf of an employee or their dependents from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and 
benefits of the employee or their dependents against the employer failing to 
make the compensation payments. 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insol-
vent employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The 
court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section 
a priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in 
the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent employer* The 
expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority 
as the liquidator's expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or 
liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the 
covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against 
the fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the 
assets of the insolvent employer. 
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same 
rights as allowed under § 35-1-62. 
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division 
of the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting 
its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk manage-
ment company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise 
and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon ren-
dering a decision with respect to any claim for benefits under this chapter, 
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value 
of the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the 
additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards 
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-107 
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state 
treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, 
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to 
the assets in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the 
making of any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and 
payment of claims for compensation from the fund. 
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund to pay benefits pursuant to the provisions of this section to any em-
ployee of an insolvent self-insured employer, the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund may assess all other self-insured employers amounts necessary to pay 
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses 
of handling covered claims subsequent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of 
examinations under Subsection (12), and (d) other expanses authorized by 
this section. The assessments of each self-insured employer shall be in the 
proportion that the manual premium of the self-insured employer for the 
preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium of all self-insured 
employers for the preceding calendar year. Each self-insured employer 
shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 days before it is due. 
No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an amount greater 
than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for the preceding 
calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in any one year 
an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the fund for one 
or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid 
as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are liable 
under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the self-
insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance 
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made 
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior 
to July 1,1986. 
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to jiotify the Industrial 
Commission of any information indicating that any sblf-insured •aiployer 
may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or 
the public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, 
the Industrial Commission may order an examination of that self-insured 
employer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-
insured employers as provided in Subsection (11). The results of the exami-
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Hales Sand & Gravel 
Enclosed you will find reports and certificates relating to the untimely death 
of Randi Hale. 
As it appears there are no dependents and claiming benefits. We will await 
your order regarding payments to the Default Indemnity Fund. 
Very truly yours, 








THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Of UTAH 
EDWARD ALTER, State Treasurer 
and Custodian of the UNINSURED 
EMPLOYERS* FUND and the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION of UTAH, 
Applicants, 
HALES SAND AND GRAVEL and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
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DEATH BENEFITS ORDER 
WHEREAS, Randi (Marvidikis) Hales was fatally injured as the result of an 
accident arising out of or in the course of her employment with Hales Sand and 
Gravel, on July 31, 1986. 
WHEREAS, Section 35-1-68 (2) (a), U. C. A., provides that if the 
Commission has reasonably determined that there are no dependents of a 
deceased employee, it may issue an Order for the employer or insurance carrier 
to pay into the Uninsured Employers* Fund the sum of $30,000.00. In the event 
no dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of death, this 
Order shall become permanent and final, and 
WHEREAS, the Commission has reasonably determined that there are no 
dependents and desires to have the statutory amount herein above stated paid 
into the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and further, the Commission is of the 
opinion that the statutory funeral allowance of $1,800.00 should also be paid, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants pay to the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, c/o Edward Alter, State Treasurer, the sum of $30,000.00 for 
the use and benefit of the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any claim made by undetermined or potential 
dependents of the deceased must be made within one year from the date of death 
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or the funds herein ordered paid to the Uninsured Employers* Fund shall become 
the property of the Uninsured Employers' Fund without further order of the 
Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay the statutory funeral 
allowance. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
<%/'*f day of /&./-/frsr.A/~ » 1986. 
^ 
ATTEST: 
' Linda J. Strasburg y^ 
Commission Secretary 
m e iiMuu^ iHiiiL, uunnissiUN OF UTAH 
Case No. 860009b2 
EDWARD ALTER, State Treasurer, 
and Custodian of the 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Applicants, 
vs. 
HALES SAND AND GRAVEL and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 




















MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about August 21, 1986, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about September 9, 1986, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendant, Hales Sand and Gravel, by and through their 
attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of August 21, 1986, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
//" ~ .day of December, 1986. 






Walter T. Axelgard 
Commissioner 
L. Nielsen 
Commissioner £0 
